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NONCONFORMING USES IN ILLINOIS
CAROLYN KRAUSE*
INTRODUCTION
Z ONING ORDINANCES have existed in the United States for four
decades. They- are recognized as a proper exercise of the police
power, and are sustained as constitutional if fair and reasonable.1
Illinois municipalities have, in many instances, adopted compre-
hensive master plans to aid in city planning. Pursuant to these
plans, detailed zoning maps have usually been prepared describing
the use which can be made of land in particular areas of the
municipality. The word "use" in connection with zoning may
refer to any possible use of land including the erection of a building
thereon, the business carried on in the building, as well as excava-
tions from the land.2
The object of zoning classification is to put land to the use to
which it is best suited. The classification is determined, usually,
by the prevailing use, for zoning attempts to preserve the character
of a neighborhood. For example, if an area is dotted with com-
mercial buildings, the land will probably be zoned for com-
mercial uses. Likewise, if an area is predominantly residential,
the land will probably be zoned for residential use only. The estab-
lishment of mutually exclusive zoning districts, that is, districts
which are restricted to one use and one use only, insures a com-
patible and desirable environment.3
At the time of the enactment of a zoning ordinance, however,
there may-be a use of land within the affected area which does
not conform to the newly enacted ordinance. For example, there
may be a retail store in an area zoned residential or a single-family
dwelling in an area zoned commercial. These uses, although proper
before the enactment of the zoning ordinance, then become "non-
B.A., University of Wisconsin. J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law. Mrs. Krause is
a member of the Illinois Bar and is engaged in private practice in Chicago.
1 See, e.g., Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114
(1926).
2 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.26 (3d ed. rev. 1957).
3 See People ex tel. Skokie Town House Builders v. Morton Grove, 16 I1. 2d 175,
157 N.E.2d 33 (1959).
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conforming uses." Continuance of these nonconforming uses must
be permitted although they no longer conform to a new classifica-
tion.4 However, many restrictions are placed on such nonconform-
ing uses of land.
This article will study and analyze pertinent Illinois court
decisions to see how zoning regulations which apply to nonconform-
ing uses have been construed. Attention will also be focused on the
effect which abandonment, change, alteration, and expansion of
nonconforming uses have on their ultimate elimination.
NONCONFORMING USE AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
Zoning ordinances, when first enacted in Illinois, made no
provision for nonconforming uses. The court, however, soon rec-
ognized that a nonconforming use was a property right which must
be protected. Historically, the first case was Western Theological
Seminary v. City of Evanston," where the Illinois Supreme Court
refused to retroactively apply a zoning ordinance and eliminate
a nonconforming use immediately. The appellant, Western Theo-
logical Seminary, had planned to erect college buildings, including
a library, on property it had leased for that purpose. It had ex-
pended over $150,000 for its leasehold and had raised $400,000 in
funds. The zoning ordinance in effect at the time the land had
been leased permitted colleges, schools and libraries. Later, the
city amended the ordinance and eliminated the words "libraries,
schools and colleges." The appellant then sought to enjoin the
city from enforcing the amended ordinance as to its land. The
Illinois Supreme Court, in this case of first impression, reversed
the lower court's decision. Speaking in unequivocal language, the
court said:
Neither the city council nor the legislature is authorized, under
the power of the Constitution, to take away or limit the appellant's
right to make any use of the property which was lawful at the time
it acquired it, except in such ways as may be necessary for the public
health, comfort, safety or welfare. So far as the property which the
appellant acquired relying on the validity of the ordinance, per-
mitting its use for schools and colleges is concerned, the amend-
ment, by depriving it of the right to make such use-which is the
4 See City of Chicago v. Reutler Bros. Iron Works, 398 111. 202, 75 N.E.2d 355 (1947).
Is 325 Ifl. 511, 156 N.E. 778 (1927).
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destruction of the only property it acquired-is unreasonable and
arbitrary.6
The court determined, therefore, that under the guise of
zoning, a municipality could not abolish a nonconforming use im-
mediately.7 The reasoning generally given behind this doctrine
as stated in the Western Theological Seminary case is that it would
be a taking of property without due process of law if an owner of
property were prevented from continuing his nonconforming use.
Today, there is a state enabling statute which requires that
municipalities must provide for nonconforming uses in all zoning
ordinances." The following is an example of a provision concerning
nonconforming uses in a Chicago ordinance passed under this en-
abling statute.
Any nonconforming use, building or structure which existed
lawfully at the time of the adoption of this comprehensive amend-
ment and which remains nonconforming, and any such use, build-
ing or structure which shall become nonconforming upon the
adoption of this comprehensive amendment or of any subsequent
amendments thereto, may be continued, some for specified and re-
spective periods of time, subject to the regulations which follow.9
EXISTENCE AS A REQUIREMENT
In order to establish a right to a nonconforming use, the use
must have been in existence at the time the ordinance became effec-
tive. In People ex rel. Delgado v. Morris,10 a landowner in Highland
Park attempted to modify a structure so as to increase the number
of apartments available for rent. A building permit had been issued
for less intensive remodeling and when the true intentions of the
owner were discovered by the Highland Park authorities, the per-
mit was revoked. In reply to an action to compel the issuance of
the building permit, the village contended inter alia that the
6 Id. at 523, 156 N.E. at 783. See note 20 infra, for a discussion on the exception
to the rule that a nonconforming use must be in existence to qualify.
7 The idea that the right to a nonconforming use is a property right has been reiter-
ated in many subsequent cases. See, e.g., Douglas v. Village of Melrose Park, 389 Ill. 98,
58 N.E.2d 864 (1945); Schneider v. Board of Appeals of City of Ottawa, 402 Il1. 536, 84
N.E.2d 428 (1949); Village of Oak Park v. Gordon, 32 Ill. 2d 295, 205 N.E.2d 464 (1965).
8 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (1965). See note 16 infra as to the protection given
to nonconforming uses. See note 30 infra as to the provisions providing for the elimina-
tion of nonconforming uses.
9 Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code ch. 194A, art. 6 § 6.2 (1957).
10 334 Ill. App. 557, 79 N.E.2d 839 (2d Dist. 1948).
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building was in violation of a 1922 zoning ordinance and a later
amendment thereto in 1942, inasmuch as the ordinance restricted
the area to single-family residences.
The Second District Appellate Court, in overruling this con-
tention, said that the evidence showed that the building was used
as an apartment building from 1917 up to the enactment of the
ordinance. The court held that the nonconforming use was there-
fore in existence prior to and at the time of enactment of the
ordinance and that the land owner was entitled to continue such
use notwithstanding the ordinance.11
In the same vein, the Illinois courts have held that where the
owner of property, because of the circumstances, is able to use only
part of his land at one time, the entire area will be protected as
a nonconforming use.12 If an owner is excavating, he cannot remove
all the minerals at once and part of the land may remain unused
at the time the zoning becomes effective. Nevertheless, for the
purpose of determining whether a nonconforming use is in exis-
tence, all of the land is said to be an actual use, thereby exempting
the entire area from the subsequent zoning.13
It would appear that the courts are quite liberal in finding
that a nonconforming use is in existence at the time that the new
zoning becomes effective. The decisions are reasonable, and a
contrary policy would be unjust since it would be unreasonable to
require the property owner to shut down his already existing
business and move to a new location.
The use, in order to be protected, must be the same both
before and after the ordinance is made effective. In Price v. Ack-
mann,14 the court found the use was not the same. There, the
defendants erected a 10' x 10' building in 1915 and used it in their
business as carpenters and contractors. After the 1928 city ordi-
nance classifying the area as residential was passed, the defendants
11 See the following cases where it was held that a nonconforming use was in ex-
istence: City of Chicago v. Reuter Bros. Iron Works, 398 Ill. 202, 75 N.E.2d 355 (1947);
Price v. Ackmann, 345 I1. App. 1, 102 N.E.2d 194 (2d Dist. 1951); Sebath v. City of
Chicago, 56 Il. App. 2d 307, 206 N.E.2d 286 (1st Dist. 1965).
12 County of DuPage v. Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Co., 18 111. 2d 479, 165 N.E.2d 310
(1960); County of DuPage v. Gary-Wheaton Bank, 42 Ii. App. 2d 299, 192 N.E.2d 311
(2d Dist. 1963).
1s Howard v. Lawton, 22 I1. 2d 331, 175 N.E.2d 556 (1961).
14 345 111. App. 1, 102 N.E.2d 194 (2d Dist. 1951).
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erected a new building, 50' x 50'. They installed a heavy pole to
support electrical wires, put in new machinery and began to use a
neighboring tract of land. The court held that the character of
the building had so drastically changed that the defendants could
not claim a nonconforming use. On the other hand, in Goldman v.
Chicago,5 the court found the use to be the same. There, the land
was first used as a storage warehouse, and later as a terminal for
the loading and unloading of electrical appliances. The use was
held to be essentially the same as the use before rezoning, thus
qualifying as a nonconforming use.
The courts have also aided the property owner by liberally
interpreting the language of the state statute which provides for
nonconforming uses. In Village of Skokie v. Almendinger,0 the
defendants claimed a nonconforming use although, at the time
the zoning ordinance became effective, title to one of the three
lots was in another party. The defendants operated a trailer camp
on three lots, two of which they owned an one of which they ap-
parently rented. They were clearly entitled to a nonconforming
use as to the two lots they owned, but a question arose as to.
whether they were entitled to a nonconforming use as to the third
lot which they rented. The Appellate Court quoted from the state
statute which provided that in all ordinances passed pursuant
thereto ". . . .due allowance shall be made for existing condi-
tions.... The powers conferred by this article shall not be exercised
so as to deprive the owner of any existing property of its use or
maintenance for the purpose to which it is then lawfully de-
voted ..... " The court held that since all three lots were used as a
trailer camp at the time the ordinance was passed, ". . . and in
giving the-statute the liberal construction evidently indicated, the
question of title is not of paramount importance."1 8
Although the right to a nonconforming use is dependent upon
its existence prior to the effective date of the ordinance, exceptions
are made where the property owner, relying on the existing ordi-
nance, has expended large sums of money and has made a sub-
15 351 Ill. App. 2d 522, 113 N.E.2d 480 (2d Dist. 1953) (Abstr.).
16 5 II. App. 2d 522, 126 N.E.2d 421 (1st Dist. 1955).
17 Id. at 526, 126 N.E.2d at 423.
18 Id. at 527. 126 N.E.2d at 424.
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stantial change. The owner would suffer irreparable harm if not
allowed to complete his building.19 Hence, it has been held that an
owner can finish a building, enjoying, then, the use for which the
building was constructed. He would be entitled to a legal noncon-
forming use if he has made a substantial change in position.20
The question that must be decided is how "substantial" must
the reliance be in order to qualify for a nonconforming use. In
Deer Park Civic Ass'n v. City of Chicago,2' this issue was first
discussed. There, the defendants, relying on a zoning ordinance,
secured a permit to build a plant. They spent $41,000 for the prop-
erty, made contracts, and incurred liabilities in excess of $500,000.
This was held to be a substantial change, entitling the defendants
to a nonconforming use.
Although the courts do not state what dollar amounts con-
stitute a substantial change, the decisions seem to indicate that
the party must have invested thousands of dollars, as well as per-
formed other acts, such as making contracts, in order to secure a
nonconforming use. 22 The apparent reason for this ruling is that
after spending large sums of money and incurring the liability of
contracts, it would be grossly unjust to deprive the land owner of
his lawful, intended use. The damage he has suffered is not out-
weighed by the benefit to the community at large. A contrary hold-
ing would constitute a taking of the individual's property without
due process of law.
19 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.180 et seq. (3d ed. rev. 1957).
20 Ibid. See Western Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 156
N.E. 778 (1927), where the court may have been persuaded by the large sums there
expended.
21 347 Ill. App. 346, 106 N.E.2d 283 (Ist Dist. 1952).
22 In Segro v. Howarth, 54 I1. App. 2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 173 (4th Dist. 1964), the party
spent $23,000 for the property, paid fees and filed detailed plans and specifications. This
was substantial; in Illinois Masons Contractors Inc. v. City of Wheaton, 19 Il1. 2d 462,
167 N.E.2d 216 (1960), expenditures of $6500 for materials, securing a loan of $50,000
and making contracts totalling over $130,000 was substantial; in Cos Corp. v. City of
Evanston, 27 11. 2d 570, 190 N.E.2d 364 (1963), expenditures of $47,000 for the property
and adjoining property cost $189,000 were made as well as $90,000 for architect's fees
and $10,000 in legal or organizational fees. This was substantial. In People ex rel Skokie
Town House Builders v. Village of Morton Grove, 16 Il1. 2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959),
the party spent money for plans and commitments for mortgage loans as well as$1630 for permits and $200 as a deposit for sidewalks. The party also entered into an
oral construction contract for $195,000. The expenditure of the $1830 was admitted.
although whether there was such an oral contract was not admitted. This was held to
be a substantial change although it seems that the court considered the $195,000 con-
tract in reaching its decision.
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The rule should be expanded so that the mere expenditure
of money in reliance upon the ordinance is held to be a substantial
change entitling the property owner to complete the nonconform-
ing use. Consider the case of People ex rel. Nat'l Bank of Austin v.
County of Cook.2" There the court found that the plaintiff showed
only an expense of $1600 for employees' salaries. The employees
had worked on plans to build several apartments on the plaintiff's
land. This land was then zoned residential. Such reliance was held
not to be substantial. Nevertheless, it seems that the plaintiff's
loss was substantial in comparison to the public good. Certainly
the land cost more zoned for apartments than if it had been orig-
inally zoned residential. Also, the owner lost part of his investment,
since he was only allowed to erect single family residences. Al-
though it is desirable to eliminate nonconforming uses, such "elim-
ination" can be more rapidly accomplished by preventing the
expansion of nonconforming uses, rather than by cutting them off
after there has been reliance.
Although the property owner can finish his nonconforming
use if he has made a substantial change, the courts will not make
another exception and entitle him to a nonconforming use if his
previous use violated the existing ordinance. In one case,24 a county
ordinance prohibited the dumping of garbage within a distance
of one mile of the corporate limits of any city. The defendant
operated a garbage dump within one mile of the municipality
of Chicago Heights before a subsequent zoning ordinance was
passed. Defendant was not entitled to a nonconforming use because
"an illegal use cannot be a nonconforming use, '25 and it gives rise
to no rights at all.26
The Illinois courts recognize that the nonconforming use is
like a convenant running with the land, i.e., even though the
owner buys the land after an ordinance is passed changing the use,
23 56 Ill. App. 2d 436, 206 N.E.2d 441 (1st Dist. 1965).
24 County of Cook v. Triem Steel & Processing, 19 Ill. App. 2d 126, 153 N.E.2d 277
(1st Dist. 1958).
25 Id. at 129, 153 N.E.2d at 279.
26 See also Eggert v. Board of Appeals of City of Chicago, 29 Il1. 2d 591, 195 N.E.2d
164 (1963). In V'illage of Skokie v. Almendinger, 5 Ill. App. 2d 522, 126 N.E.2d 421 (1st
Dist. 1955), defendants were held to be entitled to a legal nonconforming use although
they did not have title, at first, and were actually trespassers. Nevertheless, their non-
conforming use was a permitted use at the time they used the land.
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the owner stands in the place of his grantor and has the same
rights."
It can be said, therefore, that the Illinois courts do not hesitate
in finding an existing noncomforming use. The property owner's
right to a nonconforming use seems to be paramount to the interest
of the public at large. Certainly the property owner's right should
be paramount for he improved his property lawfully, relying on
an existing ordinance. Such a right, being a property right, must
be protected.
ELIMINATION OF NONCONFORMING USES
A nonconforming use, once established, is protected from
immediate abrogation. As pointed out before, it is desirable to
eliminate these uses; the general way to eliminate them is to
... prevent any increase in the nonconformity and, when
changes in the premises are contemplated by the owner, to compel
so far as is expedient a lessening or complete suppression of the
nonconformity. ' 2
An Illinois enabling statute provides for the elimination of
nonconforming uses:
... . [P]rovisions may be made for the gradual elimination of
uses, buildings and structures which are incompatible with the
character of the districts in which they are made or located, in-
cluding, without being limited thereto, provisions (a) for the
elimination of such uses for unimproved lands or lot areas when
the existing rights of the persons in possession thereof are termi-
nated 29 or when the uses to which they are devoted are discon-
tinued; (b) for the elimination of uses to which such buildings and
structures are devoted if they are adaptable for permitted uses;
and (c) for the elimination of such buildings and structures when
they are destroyed or damaged in major part, or when they have
reached the age fixed by the corporate authorities of the munici-
pality as the normal life of such buildings or structuresaO
27 Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 111. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932); Schneider v. Board of Appeals
of City of Ottawa, 402 II. 536, 84 N.E.2d 428 (1949).
28 58 Am. Jur. Zoning § 155 (1948).
29 The author could find no case involving an ordinance passed under this section
providing that nonconforming uses could be eliminated "when the existing rights of
the persons in possession thereof are terminated." The Illinois courts do hold that a
subsequent purchaser of a nonconforming use has the same rights as his grantor. See
cases cited note 27 supra. There may be a possible conflict here if an ordinance is passed
under this section of the statute, and tested in court.
o Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 24 § 11-13-1 (1965).
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Although zoning laws are construed so as to protect noncon-
forming uses, such zoning laws ". . . . are also subject to the rule
that public policy opposes the extension and favors the ultimate
elimination of nonconforming uses."'1 The interpretation and
construction which courts give to the provisions providing for the
elimination of nonconforming uses determines whether noncon-
forming uses will be eliminated gradually (thereby benefiting the
individual property owner) or expediently (thereby aiding the
community at large).
Municipalities have passed ordinances, under the enabling
act, providing for the elimination of the nonconforming use. These
uses may be eliminated by:"
1. providing that if the use is abandoned it must then conform
to the permitted use;
2. by prohibiting a change to a different use;
3. by prohibiting substantial alterations;
4. by prohibiting expansion of extension;
5. by determining the life expectancy of the building at the end
of which time the nonconforming use must cease and conform
to the permitted use.
(1) Abandonment
Typical zoning ordinances provide that if nonconforming
uses are "discontinued or abandoned," the owner must conform
his premises to the permitted use. In Douglas v. Village of Melrose
Park,3 the Illinois Supreme Court had to determine when a non-
conforming use was discontinued. The building in question had
been used as a printing shop from 1924 until 1937. In 1937, the
printing machinery was removed and the building was vacated.
The plaintiff, as owner, tried to rent the building, but could find
no tenant. Later, she sought a permit to operate a small factory.
The village refused to grant a permit, claiming that, since the
building was not being used, it had ceased as a nonconforming use
and such use had been discontinued. The ordinance provided
that if a nonconforming use was "discontinued," the owner could
31 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.184 (3d ed. rev. 1957).
32 Id. at 25.186 et seq.
83 389 Il1. 98, 58 N.E.2d 864 (1945).
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not go back to the nonconforming use. The court held that the
word "discontinued" was equivalent to "abandonment," and that
the efforts made by the plaintiff to rent or sell did not show aban-
donment. The word "abandonment" means more than a mere
suspension of the nonconforming use.
.... [T]ime is not an essential element of abandonment though
it is evidential, especially in connection with other facts evidencing
such intention. 4
Subsequent decisions have given similar interpretations as to
the meaning of the word "abandonment." There must be an intent
to abandon, and a mere cessation of use does not result in a loss
of the nonconforming use. 5 These principles are clearly shown in
the facts of Brown v. Gerhardt.3 6 There, the plaintiffs were the
owners of a three-story residence. The building was built in 1891
and in 1914 the former owners converted the building to contain
six dwelling units. In 1923, the area was zoned residential, and the
building became a nonconforming use. From 1931-1937, the prem-
ises were used as a single-family dwelling. From 1937-1940, several
of the units were rented out. In 1940 plaintiffs bought the building
and began to remodel so that by 1942 it contained five units.
Plaintiffs sued for an injunction to restrain the zoning au-
thorities from enforcing the zoning ordinance against them. The
court had to determine whether or not the property had lost its
nonconforming status. The court said that there were two times
when the right to continue the nonconforming use could have
have been lost: First, from 1931 to 1937 when the premises were
used as a single-family dwelling, and second, from 1940 to 1942
during which time the building was being remodeled.
The court held that from 1931-1937, when the premises were
used for a single-family residence, the nonconforming use was
merely suspended. It was noted that a depression was on and much
property was vacant.
The mere fact that only one family occupied a six-family dwelling
is not conclusive of intention to abandon it for multiple-dwelling
purposes.87
34 Id. at 101-2, 58 N.E.2d 865-6 (1945).
35 People ex rel. Delgado v. Morris, 334 Ill. App. 557, 79 N.E.2d 839 (2d Dist. 1948).
36 5 I1. 2d 106, 124 N.E.2d 53 (1955). Also see McCoy v. City of Knoxville, 41 111.
App. 2d 378, 190 N.E.2d 622 (2d Dist. 1963).
87 Id. at 110. 125 N.E.2d at 56.
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From 1940-1942, the plaintiffs remodeled the premises. This, the
court held, showed the opposite of an intention to abandon.
The court's interpretation of the word "discontinued" are
just. Any doubt as to the meaning the word is generally resolved
in favor of the free use of property by the individual.
(2) Change
The second way to eliminate nonconforming uses is to provide
that if the nonconforming use is changed to a new and different
use, the use will be lost.",
Two Illinois Supreme Court cases strictly construed ordi-
nances prohibiting a "change" in nonconforming uses. In a 1954
case,89 the plaintiff bought a building after 1942 and wanted to
conduct a business of spraying paint and protective coatings on
metal parts. In 1923, the district in which the plant was located had
been classified as commercial and in 1942 it was rezoned for busi-
ness purposes. Provisions were made for the continuance of non-
conforming uses. The premises at the time of rezoning were used as
a tinsmith shop, and the second floor was used as a carpenter's wood
working shop. The plaintiff claimed that his present use was a
lawful, nonconforming use. The court held that a tinsmith and
wood working shop were not the same as the present use of spraying
paints and protective coatings on metal parts.
The fact that both might be generically described as "manufac-
turing" does not make them identical for present purposes. It is the
particular use and not its general classification that is contemplated
by the ordinance. 40
The court took a similar stand in a later case.4 The plaintiff's
property contained a one story brick building. Prior to 1900 the
plaintiff had manufactured small items and employed about twenty
men. The area was rezoned, prohibiting factories, but provided for
the continuance of nonconforming uses. Later, the plaintiff manu-
factured road building equipment and employed forty-five men.
38 A use must be the same before and after the rezoning ordinance is passed. See
City of Chicago v. Ruether Bros. Iron Works, 398 Il. 202, 75 N.E.2d 355 (1947); Price v.
Ackmann, 345 Il. App. 1, 102 N.E.2d 194 (2d Dist. 1951); Sabath v. City of Chicago, 56
I1. App. 2d 307, 206 N.E.2d 286 (1st Dist. 1965).
39 Wechter v. Board of Appeals, 3 111. 2d 13, 119 N.E.2d 747 (1954).
40 Id. at 15, 119 N.E.2d at 748.
41 Dube v. City of Chicago, 7 111. 2d 313, 131 N.E.2d 9 (1955).
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Since a nonconforming use must be the same both before and after
the effective date of the new ordinance in order to be protected,"
it became necessary -to determine whether there had been a change
in the nonconforming use. The court held that the present use
was different,, and, therefore, plaintiffs had to comply with the
ordinance: The court reasoned that ". . . . though the new use
and old fall within the classification of 'manufacturing,' it is the
particular use and not the general classification which governs." 3
The narrow construction by the court means that the sub-
sequent purchaser must continue the business of his predecessor
if he wants to continue the nonconforming use of the premises.
If he changes to a new business, although still in the same classifica-
tion, he will lose the right to continue the nonconforming use.
(3) Alterations
Another way to eliminate a nonconfroming use is to place a
limit on the amount of alterations which can be made.44 By limiting
the alterations, it is hoped that the property owner will give up his
nonconforming use and move to an area where his use is permitted.
When the Illinois Supreme Court first passed on the question
of the validity of such alteration ordinances, the ordinance in ques-
tion prohibited alterations or repairs in excess of thirty percent
of the buildings cubic contents. 45 The court held that the power to
regulate a nonconforming use also included the power to limit the
alterations of the use. 0 In that case, the plaintiff made a general
charge that the ordinance restrained him from using the property
for a more profitable enterprise. The court replied that this argu-
ment could be made to almost any property in any zoned district
and had no substance to it.4 7
The majority of decisions interpreting "alteration ordinances,"
indicate that mere internal alterations using the same space in the
42 See, e.g., Price v. Ackmann, 345 111. App. 1. 102 N.E.2d 194 (2d Dist. 1951); Gold-
man v. Chicago, 351 I1. App. 111, 113 N.E.2d 480 (2d Dist. 1953) (Abstr.).
43 Dube v. City of Chicago, supra note 41, at 522, 131 N.E.2d at 14.
44 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.180 et seq. (3d ed. rev. 1957).
45 Mercer Lumber Co. v. Village of Glencoe, 390 Ill. 138, 60 N.E.2d 913 (1945).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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same building do not involve substantial alterations and are
proper. 48
(4) Expansion or Extension
Similar to alteration restrictions are ordinances which prevent
a property owner from expanding or extending his nonconforming
use. Since a property owner desires and may find it necessary to
enlarge his business, such ordinances, it is thought, will encourage
him to move to areas where his business is permitted.
Although Illinois courts were liberal in their finding of non-
conforming uses, the courts are not liberal in their interpretations
of ordinances limiting expansion or extension. Some ordinances
prohibit expansion or extension altogether, and these ordinances
have been upheld.49 Generally, "expansion" or "extension" is
interpreted to mean to extend or enlarge onto additional land.
Thus, where the property owner had a nonconforming use con-
sisting of two steel towers used for radio broadcasting, the erection
of signs on the towers advertising the owner, although such signs
were seventy-five feet high, did not expand the nonconforming
use.
50
Other ordinances have allowed a limited amount of enlarge-
ment on the owner's land and these ordinances were also upheld.
In one case, 51 the plaintiff wanted to replace a nonconforming use,
a tavern, with a new building which would be more than fifty
percent larger. The applicable ordinance allowed a maximum of
a fifty percent increase in an expansion of a nonconforming use.
The court, in denying plaintiff's request to enlarge his building,
put great stress on the fact that the area was zoned residential and
was now ninety-five percent residential. The trend was towards
single-family homes in this area, and the tavern was not compatible
with the zoning then in effect.
Although there are tight restrictions on expansion, the non-
48 See, e.g., Schneider v. Board of Appeals of City of Ottawa, 402 Il. 536, 84 N.E.2d
428 (1949). Also see Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 28 Ill. 2d 341,192 N.E.2d 343 (1963), where the plaintiff wanted to increase his nonconforming use by
40 percent, which was not allowed.
49 Gore v. City of Carlinville, 9 Ill. 2d 286, 137 N.E.2d 347 (1958).
50 Fcderal Electric Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Village of Mount Prospect,
398 I1. 142, 75 N.E.2d 359 (1947).
51 Board v. County of Cook, 27 Il1. 2d 52, 187 N.E.2d 676 (1963).
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conforming user can still continue his use. Further, his noncon-
forming use is probably one of the very few of that kind in that
area, thereby giving the property owner a monoply in his business.
Whether or not a limitation on expansion includes a limita-
tion on volume or intensity is also a problem. The First and Second
District Appellate Courts have been faced with this question. The
First District has held that where the county zoning ordinance
prohibited a nonconforming use from being expanded, the pro-
hibition included an increased intensity of the same use as well
as an expansion beyond the original purpose.5
However, the Second District Appellate Court ruled that
where the zoning ordinance contains no restrictions upon an
increase in volume, none will be implied. 53 Thus, an increase of
a nonconforming use from a two-family dwelling to a three-family
dwelling was allowed. The Second District Court indicated that
the word "expansion" could limit an increase in intensity or
volume in the same building, but the ordinance must specifically
state such limitation, i.e., the court will not imply that the mu-
nicipal corporation meant to include intensity or volume in the
word "expansion."
Another Second District case also held that a limit on intensity
must be specifically spelled out in the ordinance.54 There, the
defendant had been operating a summer camp on his land since
1915. When the rezoning was adopted, he had about fifteen trailers
in one line on his land, and one electrical line furnished electricity
to the trailers. Thereafter, the number of trailers increased to
seventy or eighty in five lines and the defendant put in four more
power lines. The applicable ordinance said that ". . . a noncon-
forming use of the land shall not be extended beyond the area
actually so used at the time of the passage of the ordinance. ' ' 55 The
trial court held that the defendant had violated the ordinance
because the extent or volume of business conducted on his land
52 People v. Triem Steel &: Processing Inc., 5 Il. App. 2d 371, 125 N.E.2d 678 (lst
Dist. 1955) (Abstr.).
53 Village of Round Lake Park v. Dice, 6 I1. App. 2d 408, 127 N.E.2d 875 (2d
Dist. 1955). Also see People ex rel. Delgado v. Morris, 334 Ill. App. 557, 79 N.E.2d 839
(2d Dist. 1948).
54 People v. Ferris, 18 Ii. App. 2d 346, 152 N.E.2d 183 (2d Dist. 1958).
55 Id. at 351, 152 N.E.2d at 185-6.
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had been increased by parking additional trailers beyond the "area"
actually occupied by trailers at the time of the passage of the
ordinance.
The Appellate Court, however, in reversing, held that the
ordinance ". . . intended to limit nonconforming uses of land to
a tract5" actually used or to a use existing at the time of the passage
of the ordinance, .as distinguished from a tract held for some con-
templated future use. ' 57 The court cited the case of Village of
Skokie v. Almendinger,58 and said that in that case similar provi-
sions of the Cities and Villages Act were liberally construed. "A
liberal construction of the Act does not permit a limitation of such
protection to a portion only of a property devoted to such use or
to an area thereof actually so used." 59 The court further stated
that no provision of the Lake County zoning ordinance prohibited
any increase in intensity or volume of the use.
The principle behind ordinances which limit alterations,
change and expansion is directed toward containing the uses from
actually becoming a new use. This prohibition should not be ap-
plied where a use is broadened in its own original confines.60
(5) Amortization
Municipal corporations attempt to eliminate nonconforming
uses further by providing for the amortization of nonconforming
structures.8 1 Amortization ordinances provide for the determina-
tion of the life expectency of the building, and at the end of this
contemplated lifetime, the use must cease. The owner has had the
beneficial use of his property over the period of its lifetime, and is
believed to have recovered his investment. Thus, if the restrictions
on alteration, change and expansion do not rid the area of the
nonconformity, amortization provisions certainly will.62
56 Emphasis Added.
57 Supra note 54, at 353, 152 N.E.2d at 186.
58 5 Ill. App. 2d 522, 126 N.E.2d 421 (1st Dist. 1955).
59 People v. Ferris, supra note 54, at 353, 152 N.E.2d at 187.
60 Comparison should be made to Illinois Supreme Court decisions construing the
alteration ordinances. See, e.g., Mercer Lumber Company Co. v. Village of Glencoe, 390
Ill. 138, 60 N.E.2d 913 (1945); Schneider v. Board of Appeals of City of Ottawa, 402 111.
536, 84 N.E.2d 428 (1949). The decisions involving "alteration ordinances" are analogous
to the cases involving the "intensity ordinances."
61 The provisions in the state statute are found in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, § 11-13-1
(1965).
62 The purpose for eliminating nonconforming uses is justified, yet these amortiza.
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In Village of Oak Park v. Gordon,63 the Illinois Supreme
Court was called upon to determine the validity of an amortization
ordinance for the first time. Oak Park passed an ordinance in May,
1958, providing that all nonconforming rooming and boarding
houses located within any dwelling district had to be removed or
converted to a permitted use by May 1, 1963. The owner of a
rooming house continued to rent to two or more roomers, but
no more. The defendant, Gordon, failed to convert his rooming
house, and the village filed a quasi-criminal complaint against
him in the municipal court. The defendant bought the house in
1951 for $31,000 and invested $10,000 in improvements. In order
to comply with the amortization ordinance, he would have had
to discontinue renting two rooms, thereby losing over $1200 an-
nually, or make expensive alterations to convert the upstairs into
rooming space for two boarders. The house looked like other
houses in the neighborhood.
The court held that there was no evidence that the public
interest would be helped in any way by requiring the defendent
to alter his property to accommodate two instead of four roomers.
".. . [I]t is undisputed that defendant would suffer a financial loss
if he were required to comply with the ordinance. 6 4 The court
held the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to the defendant's
property, and further said:
In so holding, we do not intend to express any opinion as to the
validity of this or other amortization ordinances as applied to other
properties. Each case must be judged upon the particular facts of
that case due consideration given to the respective interests of the
public and the individual property owners.65
Although the Gordon decision applies only to its particular
tion ordinances compel a property owner to cease his nonconforming use even though
the property is still usable, while having no effect on other property which does not
conform because of special provisions such as spot zoning and variances. While one
property owner can be compelled to conform his apartment building to a single-family
residence by amortization, another property owner may continue his apartment building
in the same area with no restrictions if he has received a variance.
Spot zoning-Where the owner's property is rezoned, taking it out of the general
classification, because as presently zoned his property would be useless. Variance-Where
the land owner would suffer an unreasonable hardship if the zoning ordinance were
not varied. He must show that his land will not produce a reasonable profit as presently
zoned; that his situation is due to unusual circumstances, and that the essential character
of the general area will not be materially altered if the variance is granted.
63 32 Ill. 2d 295, 205 N.E.2d 464 (1965).
64 Id. at 298, 205 N.E.2d at 466.
65 Ibid.
NONCONFORMING USES IN ILLINOIS
facts, it does temper the idea of having a short and limited period
of time in which to eliminate a nonconforming use. Whether future
amortization ordinances will receive the same treatment is still
subject to conjecture.
LOCATION ORDINANCES
There is one line of cases which, although not primarily con-
cerned with nonconforming uses, results in giving nonconforming
uses preferential treatment.
The facts in these unexpected cases were identical. The mu-
nicipalities had passed "location" ordinances which stated that
no tanks for the storage of flammable liquids could be installed
on any lot where any of the boundaries of the lot were within 200
feet of a public building. The plaintiffs wanted to use their land
for filling stations; the land was generally less than 200 feet away
from buildings used for public gatherings. These location ordi-
nances were attacked on the grounds that they did not apply to
existing, nonconforming uses, filling stations which were within
200 feet of public buildings; therefore, it was contended that there
was an unreasonable discrimination and the plaintiffs were denied
equal protection of the laws.
In Rasmussen v. Village of Bensenville," the court said:
Plaintiffs have cited cases from other jurisdictions6 7 which hold
that location ordinances of this type under consideration are un-
constitutional in that they do not apply to all nonconforming uses.
(Citing authorities.) However, in view of Illinois legislature recog-
nition of nonconforming uses, and of the Illinois court decisions
on this subject, we find no constitutional objection to the Location
Ordinance on the ground of discrimination and unequal applica-
tion with reference to the nonconforming use.68
The Illinois courts have upheld location ordinances 9 on the
66 56 I. App. 2d. 119, 205 N.E.2d 631 (2d Dist. 1965).
67 One of the cases cited was Boothby v. City of Westbrook, 138 Me. 117, 25 A.2d
316 (1941). There the court was faced with a similar location ordinance and held it was
unconstitutional since it did not apply to existing nonconforming uses. The court said:
"Insofar as fire prevention is concerned, which is the sole legitimate purpose for which
the ordinance could be enacted and is authorized, no real and valid distinction .between
the business prohibited and those permitted by the exception clause is discoverable. ...
Allowing the owners of existing filling stations to continue to operate certainly does not
promote fire prevention." Id. at 124, 25 A.2d at 319.
68 Rasmussen v. Village of Bensenville, supra note 66, at 126, 205 N.E.2d at 634.
69 Also see Schwartz v. City of Chicago, 19 Il1. 2d 62, 166 N.E.2d 59 (1960).
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grounds that they have a direct relationship to the public safety.
Evidence showed that gas tanks could explode and, therefore, a
distance of 200 feet-was necessary in order to safely remove people
from public buildings in the event of an explosion. The ordinances
are based upon the police powers of the municipalities, and there
is a definite safety requirement which is being met.70 Yet it seems
to this writer that the decisions which uphold location ordinances
are erroneous when they overrule a defense of equal protection
of the laws on the grounds that a nonconforming use is a property
right to be protected as opposed to a future use which is not to
be protected. A gas tank of a filling station is just as dangerous to
public safety regardless of whether it is classified as a nonconform-
ing use and permissible, or whether it is classified as being pro-
hibited under the provisions of a location ordinance. The classifica-
tion made by location ordinances does deny equal protection of the
laws.
A conflict 'becomes apparent when it is realized that location
ordinances are upheld to protect public safety and nonconforming
uses which are, in instances such as these, just as dangerous as the
activities proscribed by location ordinances are upheld to protect
property rights. In one instance public safety is held to outweigh
a property right and in the other instance a property right is held
to outweigh the public safety. The fact that the distinguishing
element is the existence of a use before the location ordinance is
passed makes the conflict almost incredible. This would seem to
indicate that the controversy between the individual property
owner and the community at large is not settled as yet after four
decades of zoning decisions.
CONCLUSION
When zoning ordinances first appeared, Illinois courts were
liberal in finding nonconforming uses protected. When it came,
however, to the question of whether the uses had been eliminated
70 Although the point was not involved, it would seem that the municipality could
get'rid of nonconforming uses where such uses would' be substantially detrimental to
the safety and welfare of the community.
Certainly, ordinances which provide for health and safety regulations, e.g., minimum
building requirements, apply to existing nonconforming uses. See, e.g., Abbate Bros. v.
City of Chicago, 11 I11. 2d 337, 142 N.E.2d 691 (1957); City of Chicago v. Miller, 27 Ill.
2d 211, 188 N.E.2d 694 (1963).
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by alteration, expansion or change, the courts were not as liberal.
In most instances, it was felt that the desirability of community
planning, which benefited the majority, was superior to the rights
of the individual property owner to expand or alter an existing
nonconforming use. Ordinances providing for the elimination of
nonconforming uses have generally been upheld. Nevertheless,
decisions do appear which indicate that the courts still weigh the
interest of the property owner and the interest of the community at
large, in the hopes of striking the most favorable balance. Until
now, the courts have been intent on balancing the interests of the
individual and the community, always being careful that the
individual property owner's rights are considered.
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